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CASE COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BRIBERY AND
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.,
847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988)
In Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc. 1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the act of state
doctrine2 does not bar lawsuits3 against individuals who bribe foreign
officials.4
After soliciting bids to construct an aeromedical center for the Niger-
ian Air Force, the Nigerian Defense Ministry awarded the defendant,
W.S. Kirkpatrick,5 the contract. The plaintiff, Environmental Tectonics
Corporation International6 initiated an investigation upon learning that
it had submitted a substantially lower bid than Kirkpatrick on the same
project. Environmental Tectonics investigation revealed a detailed
scheme of illegal payments made by Kirkpatrick to Nigerian military and
political officials in order to secure the contract.7 Environmental Tecton-
1. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
2. Under the act of state doctrine, both federal and state courts will refrain from adjudicating
cases which raise sensitive foreign policy concerns even though they have proper jurisdiction. See
infra notes 15-20.
3. The plaintiff, Environmental Tectonics, brought antitrust charges pursuant to the Robin-
son-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1938) and racketeering charges under the New Jersey Anti-
Racketeering Act, 2C N.J.S.A. § 41-1 and the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970).
4. 847 F.2d at 1067.
5. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. Inc. is a New Jersey corporation which sells and brokers aircraft
equipment, parts and facilities to airlines and foreign air forces. Other named defendants included
Kirkpatrick International, its wholly owned subsidiary, which was formed specifically to carry out
W.S. Kirkpatrick's duties under this particular Nigerian contract; Carpenter, Kirkpatrick's chief
executive officer; and Akindele, a Nigerian citizen and Kirkpatrick's agent. 847 F.2d at 1055.
6. Environmental Tectonics Corporation International is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Pennsylvania and, like Kirkpatrick, it manufactures and sells aircraft
equipment and facilities. Id.
7. Kirkpatrick's chief executive officer, Carpenter, hired a Nigerian national, Akindele, to act
as Kirkpatrick's local agent in all matters pertaining to the contract at issue. Akindele informed
Carpenter that to secure the contract, Kirkpatrick would have to pay a sales commission totalling
20% of the contract price. Most of the 20% was to be paid to Nigerian political and military
officials. Through a written agreement with Akindele, Kirkpatrick agreed to pay the commission to
two Panamanian corporations controlled by Akindele. In turn, those corporations were to pay the
commission to the Nigerian officials. Shortly thereafter, the Defense Ministry awarded Kirkpatrick
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ics reported its findings to the Nigerian and United States governments.
An investigation by the United States Justice Department culminated in
criminal sanctions' against defendant under the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (FCPA).9 After Kirkpatrick's sentencing, Environmental Tec-
tonics filed suit to recover damages resulting from the lost contract.
Kirkpatrick filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the act of state
doctrine barred adjudication of the claim.'"
After receiving a "Bernstein letter" from the State Department," the
the contract and paid it in four installments. After Kirkpatrick received each installment, it fun-
nelled payments via the United States mails and wire transfers to the two Panamanian corporations
controlled by Akindele. Akindele then distributed the funds, totalling $1.7 million. Id.
8. During plea bargaining, Kirkpatrick and Carpenter agreed to submit offers of proof setting
forth the entire bribery scheme. The district court imposed a $75,000 fine on Kirkpatrick, payable
over a five year period, and sentenced Carpenter to two hundred hours of community service and a
fine of $10,000. Id. at 1056.
9. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(l) (1977), to
stem the growing tide of corruption abroad. These corrupt practices create foreign policy problems
by embarrassing friendly governments, lowering the esteem of the United States, and casting doubt
on the credibility of American enterprise. H.R. Rep. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The
relevant portion provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern.., or any officer, director, employee, or
agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such domes-
tic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value to -
(1) any foreign official for purposes of -
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capac-
ity, including a decision to fail to perform his official functions; or
(B) inducing such foreign officials to use his influence with a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality.
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person...
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1).
10. Kirkpatrick also filed a motion to dismiss the racketeering claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(B)(6), contending that Environmental Tectonics had failed to allege a "pattern of
racketeering activity" as required by federal and state racketeering statutes. 847 F.2d at 1056. See
supra note 3.
11. A "Bernstein letter" from the State Department will authorize the court to either go for-
ward with or abstain from deciding the merits of a claim that may impede relations between the
United States and the foreign sovereign that is party to the suit. The term has its origin in a 1954
suit brought by a German Jew, Arnold Bernstein, to recover properties expropriated by the Nazis
during World War II. Bernstein v. N. V Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschapp,
173 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1949), amended, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d Cir. 1954). The Second
Circuit initially refused to hear the claim because the act of state doctrine precluded judicial review.
After the Second Circuit declined to adjudge the validity of the acts of the German government,
Bernstein obtained a letter from the State Department stating that in cases involving Nazi expropria-
tions the Executive branch had a policy to allow aggrieved parties to pursue their claims in federal
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United States District Court for the District of New Jersey concluded
that the act of state doctrine barred adjudication of the case because the
cause of action required the plaintiff to prove that Nigerian officials vio-
lated Nigerian law.12 The district court reasoned that such a finding
would implicitly criticize Nigeria's handling of its internal affairs and
threatened to hinder the relations between Nigeria and the United
States.'3 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and held: the act of state
doctrine does not foreclose judicial inquiry into the motivations of for-
eign governments if the potential negative impact on foreign relations is
merely speculative and if application of the doctrine would thwart the
United States legitimate interest in implementing its regulatory
policies. 14
The act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into the
validity of public acts that a recognized foreign sovereign power commits
within its own territory. The Supreme Court first adopted the doctrine
in 1897.15 The Supreme Court has struggled to define the act of state
courts. The Second Circuit accordingly amended its original order and allowed Bernstein to proceed
with his claim.
As used in this comment the term "Bernstein exception" refers to a scenario in which the State
Department states in its Bernstein letter to the court that it has no objection to the suit going for-
ward. Although the Bernstein exception has not been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court
most lower federal courts refuse to act in the absence of the State Department's approval. See infra
notes 37 and 65.
12. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc., 659 F. Supp.
1381,1391-98 (D.N.J. 1987). Both bribery and acceptance of a bribe by a government official are
illegal under Nigerian law. See Decree No. 38 (November 2, 1975) in Federal Republic of Nigeria
Official Gazette Extraordinary, No. 59, December 2, 1975.
13. 659 F. Supp. at 1391-98. ETC reported the findings of its investigation to the Nigerian Air
Force and made several futile attempts to trigger governmental action.
14. 847 F.2d at 1060-61.
15. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Underhill, an U.S. businessman, brought a
damages claim against Hernandez, a revolutionary Venezuelan military commander. Underhill
claimed that Hernandez unlawfully denied him a passport, and coerced him into operating his wa-
terworks business for the benefit of the Venezuelan revolutionary forces. The Court refused to in-
quire into the alleged illegal acts of Hernandez because he committed the acts under the authority of
a defacto government that the United States later recognized. Id. at 254. Thus, the Court invoked
the defense of sovereign immunity and barred Underhill's claim. Id. See infra note 17.
In dictum, Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for a unanimous Court, laid the foundation for the act of
state doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must
be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.
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doctrine's parameters ever since the doctrine's inception. 16 The Court's
early decisions attributed the origins of the doctrine to principles of sov-
ereign immunity,1 7 conflict of laws,"8 and international comity.' 9 Mod-
em act of state analysis, however, rests on the separation of powers
doctrine.2°
The Court first used the separation of powers analysis in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.21 In that case, the Castro regime, in retalia-
tion for U.S. actions against Cuba, adopted a law that gave Cuba
discretionary power to nationalize, by forced expropriation, property or
enterprises in which U.S. nationals had an interest.22 Despite the fact
IMt at 252.
One commentator has suggested that this statement "detached the doctrine from its personal im-
munity moorings and allowed it to drift into unchartered territory." Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of
State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 333 (1986).
16. See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
17. The doctrine of sovereign immunity grants to officials personal immunity from liability for
acts committed in the scope of their government duties. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (1982). The act of state doctrine originally emerged as a corollary to
sovereign immunity, extending immunity to individual officials acting on behalf of the foreign gov-
ernment. Today, the sovereign immunity defense is available only to the government or government
official that is a party to the suit, whereas private litigants may raise the act of state defense if the
cause of action implicates a foreign government. See Bazyler, supra note 15, at 331.
18. Under the traditional principles of conflict of laws, the laws of each state have force within
the boundaries of the state and bind all subject to it. However the state's law has no extraterritorial
effect except to bind those persons whose rights vested within the limits of the state. Once vesting
has occurred the law of the state in which the vested rights were acquired applies in any jurisdiction.
See Ricaud v. American Metal Co,, 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) (barring adjudication of an expropria-
tion suit because the act was deemed lawful under Mexican law, although contrary to American
policy). See also LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 163-66 (1947).
19. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918) (the act of state doctrine "rests at
last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency").
20. The separation of powers doctrine precludes one branch of the national government from
impeding the function of another branch. Additionally, the separation of powers doctrine forbids
one branch from expanding its power beyond its constitutionally delegated authority. Historically,
the doctrine served two purposes. First, the division of labor among the three branches and the
concentration of executive power in the President promotes efficiency. Second, the doctrine pre-
vents tyranny: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison). See
generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 339-346
(1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-1 to 2-4 (1978).
For an argument that the act of state doctrine violates the doctrine of separation of powers, see
Bazyler supra note 15, at 375.
21. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
22. Id. at 401-02. The United States had reduced Cuba's sugar quota and froze Cuban assets in
the United States. Id.
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that such a taking violated international law,23 the Court refused to ex-
amine the validity of a taking of property by a foreign sovereign govern-
ment within its territory. The Court found that the judicial branch
should defer to the executive branch in matters of sensitive foreign policy
because judicial intervention may actually "hinder rather than further
this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of
nations as a whole in the international sphere.24
The Court recognized that although the "text" of the Constitution
does not require the act of state doctrine, the doctrine does have "consti-
tutional underpinnings" arising out of the relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers.25
Although subsequent legislation overruled Sabbatino's holding regard-
ing international takings26 the Court's flexible analysis based on a "bal-
ancing of relevant considerations"27 has survived. However, the Court's
failure to identify the precise factors to be weighed,28 its refusal to for-
23. Id. at 428-29.
24. Id. at 423.
25. Id.
26. In reaction to the Sabbatino decision, Congress enacted the "Hickenlooper Amendment" in
1964. The amendment states in pertinent part:
no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine
to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in
a case in which a claim of title or other rights to property is asserted by any party including
a foreign state... based upon (or traced through) a confiscation of other taking... by an
act of that state in violation of the principles of international law....
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
27. 376 U.S. at 428.
28. The Court suggested that the following factors were relevant considerations: the sensitive
nature of the issue, the ability of the executive branch to redress the grievances and the consensus of
international law on the subject. Id. at 428. The Court also emphasized the ideological discord
between capitalistic and communistic countries concerning the state's power to expropriate the prop-
erty of aliens. The Court, however, suggested that the existence of a "treaty or other unambiguous
agreement" might alter its analysis. Id. at 428-31.
Alternatively, one court incorporated the balancing test normally employed in the context of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit considered the following factors relevant in determin-
ing extraterritorial jurisdiction:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties,
the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforce-
ment by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is
an explicit purpose to harm or affect U.S. commerce, the foreseeability of such an effect,
and the relative importance to the violation charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976). See
also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3rd Cir. 1979) (applying
the Timberlane factors in the extraterritorial jurisdiction context). Only one court, however, has
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mulate an inflexible rule of noninterference in international affairs29 and
its limited application of its own test30 have generated confusion among
the lower courts concerning possible exceptions to the act of state
doctrine.3
The Court's post-Sabbatino decisions have added to the uncertainty in
the area because no one exception to the act of state doctrine has at-
tracted a majority of the Court. For example, in First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba3 2 the Bernstein exception garnered the
support of only three Justices.3 3 Similarly, in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba3" only a plurality could agree that the act of
state doctrine should not encompass commercial acts by foreign sover-
applied the Timberline test in the act of state context. See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534
F. Supp. 896, 903-08 (E.D. Mich. 1981), See generally Note, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion In
American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 131, 136 (1980).
29. 376 U.S. at 428. The Court noted that,
the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of interna-
tional law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since
the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact
rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the na-
tional interest or with international justice.
Id. The Court suggested that the judiciary might interfere if the issue involved touched less sharply
on national nerves. Id. See also supra note 28.
The Court noted that international law is divided on the limits of a state's power to expropriate
alien property. Id. at 428-31.
30. 376 U.S. at 428. The Court has never applied the Sabbatino analysis in any context other
than expropriation of property cases. Subsequent to Sabbatino, the Court has only expounded on
the scope and application of the doctrine on two occasions, and both instances involved the national-
ization of U.S. property interests by the Castro regime. See infra notes 34-37.
31. The federal courts of appeals have disagreed whether a treaty or valid agreement exception
to the act of state doctrine exists. Compare Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahirya, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing to enforce an otherwise binding arbitra-
tion agreement between the plaintiff and Libya) with Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional
Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984) (enforcing a treaty between the
United States and Ethiopia forbidding takings without adequate compensation).
32. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). In Citibank, the Castro government seized all Cuban branches of the
petitioner's bank without just compensation. Respondent defaulted on a loan by petitioner, and
petitioner sold the loan collateral and applied the proceeds toward the loan. The proceeds, however,
exceeded the unpaid balance of the loan and respondent sought to recover the excess. The petitioner
counterclaimed for damages resulting from the expropriation of its property by the Cuban govern-
ment. The Court distinguished Sabbatino because of the differing foreign policy positions of the
executive branch in each case. In Sabbatino the executive branch took a neutral position, while in
Citibank it expressly represented to the Court in a Bernstein letter that it did not support application
of the act of state doctrine. Thus, the Citibank opinion focused on the Bernstein exception as a valid
exception to the doctrine. See infra note 37.
33. See infra note 37.
34. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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eigns. 31 Writing for the plurality, Justice White reasoned that "more dis-
cernable rules of international law have emerged with regard to
commercial deals of private parties in the international market.
36
Despite the Court's inability to agree on exceptions to the act of state
doctrine,3 7 some lower federal courts and commentators have argued
that both bribery and antitrust should be exceptions to the doctrine.38
The lower federal courts, however, are divided on whether to inquire into
35. In Dunhill, the Cuban government confiscated the business and assets of the five leading
manufacturers of Havana cigars. The foreign government appointed intervenors to occupy the
seized businesses. Dunhill, an U.S. importer, mistakenly paid sums due for accounts receivable
which accrued prior to the intervention. The former owners demanded payment from Dunhill who
in turn sought to recover its mistaken payments from the Cuban intervenors. The intervenors
claimed that the repayment obligation was a debt whose situs was in Cuba and that their refusal to
pay was an act of state.
Four members of the Court (the Chief Justice, Justice White, Powell and Rehnquist) concluded
that the refusal to pay did not constitute an act of state because of the commercial, as opposed to
governmental, nature of the transaction. The plurality justified its position on two grounds. First,
the plurality analogized to the commercial activity exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Id. at 698. Second, the plurality noted that there is a greater consensus as to the rules governing the
commercial dealings of private parties in the marketplace compared to the rules concerning govern-
mental powers. Id. at 704.
36. Id.
37. A majority of the Supreme Court has never endorsed the Bernstein exception, see supra note
11, as a valid bar to act of state immunity. In Sabbatino, the Court expressly avoided ruling on the
validity of the exception. 376 U.S. at 420. In Citibank, however, three justices (Rehnquist joined by
the Chief Justice and White) adopted the Bernstein exception, while two justices (Douglas and Pow-
ell) decided the case on other grounds and four justices (Brennan joined by Stewart, Marshall and
Blackmun) unequivocally rejected the Bernstein exception. The issue does not arise very frequently,
however, because the State Department has issued only seven Bernstein letters since 1954.
38. Lower federal courts have proposed several arguments in support of a corruption or bribery
exception. For instance, some have suggested that a corrupt or illegal act does not constitute an act
of state, See, e.g., Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub
nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1963) (financial crimes and embezzlement by a former Vene-
zuelan chief executive do not constitute acts of state). See generally McManis, Questionable Corpo-
rate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 237 (1976) (advocating a
sovereign/non-sovereign dichotomy).
Others have relied on the policy argument that the United States has a great interest in the effec-
tive enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, see supra note 9. See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v.
Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 909 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Comment, Should There Be a Bribery
Exception to the Act of State Doctrine? 17 CORNELL INT. L. REV. 401, 419 (1984). But see Note,
Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT. L.
REv. 231, 235-36 (1977) (quoting Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 84-85 (1976) (testi-
mony of John McClay)). A special review committee investigating questionable payments made by
multinational corporations testified before the Senate Committee that it "could not identify a single
country where a bribe of a government official to induce a government to enter into a contract with
any company for the supply of its product to that government was not illegal in that country."
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the motivation behind a foreign government's actions. For example, in
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 39 the Second Circuit espoused an expansive in-
terpretation of the doctrine by foreclosing judicial inquiry into the motive
of a foreign government because to do so would inevitably involve a de-
termination of the validity or legality of the government's actions. 40 In
Hunt, a small oil producer claimed that Mobil and six other competitors
conspired among themselves, in violation of U.S. antitrust laws, and with
the Libyan government, to eliminate Hunt from competition by Libyan
nationalization of Hunt's oil properties.4 Hunt challenged only its com-
petitor's actions in catalyzing the government's response and not the va-
lidity of Libya's taking itself.42 The court dismissed Hunt's claim under
the act of state doctrine because it reasoned that in order to properly
adjudicate the matter its inquiry would necessarily involve an examina-
tion of the Libyan government's motive. Because an examination into
motive might raise doubts about the validity of the taking, the Hunt
court abstained from reviewing the merits of the case.43
In Industrial Investment Development v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd. I the Fifth
Circuit expressly rejected Hunt's dual protection of motivation and valid-
ity and held that precluding all inquiry into the motivation behind the
sovereign act would uselessly thwart legitimate U.S. goals if adjudication
would not result in an embarrassment to the executive branch. In Mitsui
the court concluded that the Indonesian government's revocation of the
plaintiff's timber license, allegedly due to the defendant's monopolistic
tactics, did not raise sufficient foreign policy concerns to trigger the ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine.45 In finding an antitrust exception
to the doctrine contrary to the per se approach advanced in Hunt, the
Mitsui court stated that motivation and validity are not equally protected
39. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 76-78. For contemporaneous criticism of Hunt, see Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction
and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1247 (1977); Note, The Act of State Doctrine:
Antitrust Conspiracies to Induce Foreign Sovereign Acts, 10 INT'L LAW AND POLITICS 495 (1978).
41. Id. at 70-72.
42. Id. at 70. The complaint did not allege corruption on the part of Libya, nor did it name any
Libyan officials as defendants. Id.
43. Id. at 77-78. The court relied heavily on a State Department pronouncement characterizing
the event as a political reprisal and economic coercion. Libya proclaimed that its purpose was to
give the United States a "big hard blow in the Arab area on its cold, insolent face." Id. at 73
(quoting Hearings before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Policy Relations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 316-17 (1974) (statement of the State
Department)).
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by the act of state doctrine.46 In Mitsui the court allowed the question
concerning the foreign government's motivation only to the extent of
measuring damages. 7 Because the public interest in preserving and
maintaining effective competition in this country outweighed the mini-
mal political repercussions which might result from inquiry into the mo-
tive behind the granting of a timber license, the court concluded that the
act of state doctrine was inapplicable. 8
Similarly, in Williams v.,C urtiss- Wright Corp.,49 the Third Circuit re-
fused to invoke the act of state doctrine to immunize the anti-competitive
conduct of a defendant who dealt in a market composed of foreign gov-
ernments.5 0 In Curtiss-Wright, the court distinguished Hunt as an expro-
priation case but nevertheless criticized its broad holding." The court
focused on the degree of intervention required to meet the plaintiff, Cur-
tiss-Wright's, burden of proof. The court recognized that the burden
would require obtaining direct evidence from the foreign government. 2
However, because the complaint treated the foreign sovereigns as vic-
tims, not co-conspirators,5 3 the court concluded that Curtiss-Wright's
challenges did not question the validity of the foreign governments' acts
but rather the motivation behind them.54
To the contrary, in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.," the Ninth Circuit embraced the Hunt rationale in the bribery
context. There, Clayco claimed that Occidental bribed government offi-
cials of Umm Al Qaywayn to secure a valuable off-shore oil concession. 6
Clayco's complaint implicated the government of Umm Al Qaywayn as
an active participant in the scheme.5 In holding that the act of state
doctrine barred Clayco's suit, the court noted that the doctrine would
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 55-56. See also U.S. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 704 (1962) (a conspiracy to monopolize U.S. commerce is not outside the reach of the Sherman
Act just because part of the conduct occurred in a foreign country).
49, 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
50. Id. at 301. Defendant's actions purportedly led to the boycott of plaintiff's products by
numerous foreign governments.
51. Id. at 304 n.5.
52, Id.
53. Id. at 303-04.
54. Id. at 304.
55. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 405.
57. Id. at 406.
1989]
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not apply unless the sovereign activity affected the public interest.58 The
court decided that the case did implicate public interests because the un-
derlying dispute involved a sovereign decision affecting important natu-
ral resources.59 Thus, in declining to follow Mitsui, the Clayco court
concluded that it was unwilling to resolve issues requiring it to judge the
motivations behind a foreign sovereign's acts.'
In Environmental Tectonics v. Kirkpatrick Inc. 6 1 the Third Circuit re-
jected the strict view of Clayco and Hunt and held that the act of state
doctrine does not bar a suit which at most requires it to examine the
motives behind, rather than the legality of, a foreign government's acts.12
Although the nature of Nigeria's act constituted a sufficiently formal ex-
pression of the government's public interest,63 the court concluded that
its inquiry did not focus on the validity or legality of the Nigerian gov-
emnment's acts. Accordingly, the court employed the flexible approach
enunciated in Sabbatino."
First, the court accorded the position of the State Department in its
Bernstein letter65 significant weight, finding that the district court had
misconstrued the intent of the letter.66 Next, the court reaffirmed Cur-
tiss- Wright67 to illustrate its continuing unwillingness to allow litigants
to shield themselves from the consequences of United States regulatory
58. Id. (citing Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
59. Id. at 407. The Clayco court reconciled this factor with another decision in the Ninth
Circuit using the act of state doctrine to bar a similar cause of action. See Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C. D. Cal.), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261. (9th Cir. 1971),
cert denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (involving an act of state bar to review antitrust claims spurred by a
foreign sovereign's issue of a fraudulent territorial decree).
60. 712 F.2d at 406. The court refused to pass on the validity of the commercial exception to
the doctrine, id. at 407, and found that the bribery exception did not extend to private lawsuits. Id.
at 409.
61. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 1062.
63. Id. at 1058. The court acknowledged that contracts are usually considered commercial
acts; however, it found the commercial exception inapplicable because the bidding system of defense
contracts is by its nature governmental. Id. at 1059.
64. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 11.
66. 847 F.2d at 1059. The district court relied on one line in the letter stating that the court
should proceed with due care and caution to justify complete abstention. The Third Circuit, how-
ever, concluded that the lower court read this line out of context with the rest of the letter which
expressly stated that the State Department would allow adjudication under these facts.
67. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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policies by merely doing business abroad.6" Finally, the court concluded
that judicial inquiry into motive did not raise the type of institutional
conflict between the executive and judicial branches that would justify
applying the act of state doctrine.6 9
Although correctly recognizing a bribery exception to the act of state
doctrine, the Environmental Tectonics court employed both incomplete
and flawed reasoning. First and foremost, though the court purported to
follow Sabbatino, it failed to consider several relevant factors. For in-
stance, the court ignored the lack of consensus in international law on
the impropriety of bribery.7" One could argue, therefore, that absent
global consensus regarding the impropriety of bribery to procure govern-
ment defense contracts,71 the involvement of Nigerian government offi-
cials alone should implicate the doctrine.72 Hence, under Sabbatino and
its progeny, such foreign government involvement could outweigh the
United States interest in stemming the growing tide of international brib-
ery regardless of whether the inquiry examined motive or validity. 73
Second, the court improperly focused on the nature of the act rather
than the role of the sovereign. The court erroneously followed Curtiss-
Wright on the oversimplified ground that both cases involved govern-
ment contracts. This reliance is misplaced because the court failed to
note a critical distinction between the two cases. In Curtiss-Wright, the
foreign governments were victims, rather than active participants in the
scheme.74 Moreover, because the foreign governments in Curtiss- Wright
were guilty of no wrongdoing, an investigation in that case would neither
unduly embarrass those sovereigns or interfere with the United States'
foreign policy. Again, however, in Environmental Tectonics, the Niger-
ian government played an integral role in the illicit scheme. Although
this factor militates against adjudicating the case, the court failed to ad-
dress the unique issues raised by the bribery allegation. In particular, the
68. 847 F.2d at 1062.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 25. See generally Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for
Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT. L. REV. 231, 235-36 (1977).
71. Although it may be illegal in the United States and other western nations to procure con-
tracts through bribery, see supra note 9 and accompanying text, it is not necessarily recognized as
such in Nigeria, a third world nation. But see supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the
possibility of an international recognition of bribery as a crime).
72. The Clayco court considered this argument. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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court never addressed the issue of whether the acceptance of a bribe con-
stitutes an act of state.
Environmental Tectonics provides an essential countervailing prece-
dent to the Clayco decision. Clayco effectively foreclosed all judicial in-
quiry into bribery and justly has been criticized as providing a shield for
corruption and bribery. Although Environmental Tectonics is the first
case to recognize bribery as a legitimate exception to the act of state doc-
trine, its specious conclusion may not hold much merit for future review-
ing courts. If in fact bribery is a crime universally condemned," bribery
may be a valid exception to the act of state doctrine. However, the Envi-
ronmental Tectonics decision does not focus on this factor in carving
such an exception, but instead focuses on the limited embarrassment an
inquiry into motive will have on the Nigerian government. If later courts
considering bribery as an exception to the act of state doctrine avoid the
Environmental Tectonics pitfall and look to the Sabbatino orthodoxy,
they may create a more solid, lasting bribery exception to the act of state
doctrine.
D.E.B.
75. See supra note 9.
[Vol. 67:601
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/12
